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PROMOTIONS AND INCENTIVES IN  
NONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
JED DEVARO and DANA BROOKSHIRE*
Using data from the 1992–95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer sur-
vey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive 
promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms.  The study also uncovers 
evidence that wage increases associated with promotion were of comparable magnitudes 
in the two sectors, as was the potential for within-job wage growth; nonprofits were less 
likely than for-profits to base promotions on job performance or merit; nonprofits were 
less likely to use output-contingent incentive contracts to motivate workers; and the 
observed difference in promotion rates between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors 
was more pronounced for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers.  The authors also 
propose a theory, based on the idea that nonprofit workers are intrinsically motivated 
to a greater extent than are for-profit workers, that potentially explains the broad pat-
tern of evidence they uncover.
*Jed DeVaro is Assistant Professor of Labor Econom-
ics in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at 
Cornell University, and Dana Brookshire is an assistant 
vice president at Bank of America.  The authors are 
grateful for helpful comments from Francine Blau, 
Ronald Ehrenberg, Martin Farnham, Limor Golan, 
Jeffrey Groen, Kevin Hallock, Robert Smith, Michael 
Waldman, and seminar participants at the Society of 
Labor Economists Annual Meetings, the NBER Summer 
Institute, and Wesleyan University.  They also thank 
Jason Roche, David Rosenblum and Robert Sullivan for 
research assistance.
The data used in this study can be downloaded from 
the ICPSR website.  Results that are mentioned but not 
reported in the paper are available (along with copies 
of the STATA programs used to generate all results in 
the paper) from the first author at Cornell University; 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations; 357 Ives Hall 
East; Ithaca, NY; 14853; devaro@cornell.edu.
 growing empirical literature on non- 
 profit organizations has focused heavily 
on differences in compensation between the 
nonprofit and for-profit sectors.  The premise 
for much of this work is that compensating 
differentials might exist between nonprofit 
and for-profit jobs, with nonprofit workers 
accepting lower wages in exchange for the op-
portunity to work toward a meaningful social 
mission.  Differences between nonprofits and 
for-profits in other (non-wage) aspects of the 
employment relationship have received much 
less attention in the literature.  This paper 
is the first to study differences in promotion 
behavior between the nonprofit and for-profit 
sectors, using data on promotions from a 
large cross-section of establishments.
Such an investigation is useful for at 
least two reasons.  First, it sheds light on an 
important labor market difference between 
nonprofit and for-profit organizations, apart 
from the differences in compensation that 
have been the focus of most prior empirical 
work.  This contributes to a better under-
standing both of nonprofit organizations 
and of promotion behavior in firms more 
generally.  Furthermore, since promotions 
are associated with large wage increases 
and therefore have implications for wage 
profiles, the analysis contributes to a deeper 
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understanding of the evolution of the wage 
differentials that have been the main focus 
of prior work.  Second, since much of our 
discussion focuses on incentive creation, this 
work contributes to the empirical literature 
on incentives in organizations.
The issues we address in this paper are 
important to many, but perhaps to no group 
more than nonprofit sector workers.  Their 
numbers are large—in 2002, the sector is 
estimated to have employed some 8.8 million 
paid workers and enlisted approximately 59 
million volunteers for unpaid service (Sal-
amon and Sokolowski 2005; Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2002)—and yet by comparison 
with workers in the private sector, they have 
received little research attention.
The main objective of this study is to 
document whether there is any difference in 
promotion rates between the nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors, after controlling for the 
characteristics of workers, firms, and jobs. 
In addition, we investigate several comple-
mentary empirical questions.  In particular, 
we try to determine the extent to which the 
two sectors differ with respect to the size of 
wage increases that accompany promotions; 
the potential for within-job wage growth; the 
degree to which promotions are based on 
merit and job performance; the tendency 
to use output-based incentives as a means 
for motivating workers; average levels of job 
performance; the relationship between pro-
motion rates for high-skilled jobs and those 
for low-skilled jobs; the rate of internal hiring; 
and turnover rates.  After addressing these 
questions empirically, we propose a theory 
that potentially explains the broad pattern 
of evidence we document.
The most likely reason that the question of 
whether promotion differences exist between 
the for-profit and nonprofit sector has never 
been addressed previously is that the neces-
sary data were unavailable.  Such an analysis 
requires data from multiple organizations, 
including information on nonprofit status, 
promotion decisions, and detailed character-
istics of firms, jobs, and workers.  Data sets 
used in the empirical nonprofit literature 
generally lack information on promotions. 
Furthermore, the empirical literature on pro-
motions has used either single-firm data sets 
(which obviously are not useful for studying 
promotion differences between nonprofit 
and for-profit organizations) or cross-sections 
or panels that span multiple firms but lack 
information on nonprofit status.  Our study 
is based on data from a large cross-section 
of establishments that contains the neces-
sary information on promotions, nonprofit 
status, wages, and detailed worker, firm, and 
job characteristics.  A unique and attractive 
feature of our data set is that it also contains 
information on the job-specific performance 
ratings of workers, an important explanatory 
variable in models of wages and promotion 
decisions.  Such job-specific performance 
ratings are rarely available, particularly in 
data sets spanning multiple firms.
Data:  Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality
The Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 
(MCSUI) is a cross-sectional employer sur-
vey collected between 1992 and 1995 in the 
four metropolitan areas of Atlanta, Boston, 
Detroit, and Los Angeles.  The full sample 
consists of 3,510 establishments.1  The survey 
1Harry Holzer conducted the bulk of the survey, 
producing 3,213 cases.  A supplement of 297 cases was 
provided by Kirschenman, Tilly, and Moss.  The survey 
respondent was the owner in 14.5% of the cases, the 
manager or supervisor in 42%, a personnel department 
official in 31.5%, and someone else in 12%.  Screening 
identified a respondent who actually carried out hiring 
for the relevant position, and the survey instrument 
took 30–45 minutes to administer on the telephone, 
with an overall response rate of 67%.  For more infor-
mation about the data, see Holzer (1996).  Slightly less 
than two-thirds of the cases were drawn from regional 
employment directories provided by Survey Sampling, 
Inc. (SSI) based on local telephone directories.  This 
was a sample stratified by establishment size (25% 1–19 
employees, 50% 20–99 employees, 25% 100 or more 
employees) and was designed to be self-weighting.  The 
remaining cases were drawn from the current or most 
recent employer reported by respondents in a compan-
ion household survey.  The MCSUI household survey 
over-sampled low-income areas and areas with high 
concentrations of racial minorities.  The SSI subsample 
was restricted to employers who had hired a worker for 
a position that did not require a college degree within 
the previous three years, whereas the household sub-
sample was not restricted to entry-level jobs in this way. 
Sampling weights adjust for these considerations, and 
weighted observations are a representative sample of 
establishments such as would occur if a random sample 
of employed people were drawn from each city.  We use 
these sampling weights throughout the study.
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questions pertaining to the establishment’s 
most recently hired worker form the basis for 
our empirical analysis.  Key questions include 
whether this worker received a promotion 
by the survey date, whether a promotion 
was expected within the next five years, and 
whether the establishment was for-profit.  We 
define all variables in the appendix.
In response to the question about whether 
the establishment was for-profit, 3,217 re-
spondents answered either “yes” or “no.” 
We code the remaining 293 cases as missing 
(including responses of “don’t know,” “no 
opinion,” and “refused”).  Henceforth, we 
refer to establishments with responses of 
“no” as nonprofits, though these may include 
some governmental observations.  From the 
3,217 cases with information on for-profit 
status, we drop 16 observations for which 
the reported industry or the most recently 
hired worker’s occupation was agriculture, 
forestry, or fishing.  Of the remaining 3,201 
observations, 695 were nonprofits and 2,506 
were for-profits.
Missing values reduce the usable sample 
size for most variables in the survey.  For 
example, in Table 1, which displays the oc-
cupational distribution of jobs in our sample 
by sector, the occupation data are available 
for only 673 nonprofits and 2,443 for-profits. 
In multivariate analyses that include many 
control variables, the analysis sample shrinks 
considerably.  Throughout the paper we re-
port results based on the largest subsample 
possible for any given specification.  However, 
we have also replicated all tables using a 
smaller subsample (1,609 establishments, in-
cluding 288 nonprofits and 1,321 for-profits) 
that remains fixed across all specifications of 
the main tables of the paper.  This is the larg-
est subsample for which each observation for 
each variable appearing in any of the tables in 
the next section is non-missing.  In all cases 
the qualitative results match those we report 
in the paper, and all of these additional tables 
are available upon request.
Table 2 displays summary statistics.  The 
fraction of received promotions is only 7.6% 
because the sample consists of recently 
hired workers, many of whom had not been 
employed with the establishment for long. 
The unconditional differences in means in 
the first two rows of Table 2 reveal that re-
ceived and expected promotions were more 
likely in for-profits than in nonprofits.  The 
fraction of workers promoted by the survey 
Table 1.  Occupational Distribution by For-Profit Status.
  Unweighted Counts Weighted Counts
Occupation Nonprofits For-Profits Nonprofits For-Profits
Executive, Administrative, and Managerial Occupations 48 167 54.69 267.82
Engineers, Surveyors, and Architects 5 40 1.66 84.76
Natural Scientists and Mathematicians 4 21 13.55 27.98
Social Scientists, Social Scientists, Religious Workers, Lawyers 25 4 34.25 3.2
Teachers, Librarians, and Counselors 75 13 177.97 17.06
Health Diagnosing and Treating Practitioners 4 3 1.03 2.68
RNs, Pharmacists, Dieticians, Therapists, and Physician’s Assts. 24 25 48.71 52.19
Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes 7 33 5.16 33.6
Health Technologists and Technicians 22 31 25.97 31.44
Technologists and Technicians, except Health 8 65 21.36 61.06
Marketing and Sales Occupations 17 408 16.07 395
Administrative Support Occupations, including Clerical 242 677 227.43 629.35
Service Occupations 144 289 111.41 208.5
Mechanics and Repairers 9 83 4.9 70.39
Construction and Extractive Occupations 3 40 2.43 42.36
Precision Production Occupations 8 101 6.99 90.79
Production Working Occupations 5 221 3.77 174.77
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 14 106 7.14 90.8
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers, and Laborers 9 116 5.83 93.35
 Total 673 2,443 770.32 2,377.1
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date was twice as high in for-profits as in 
nonprofits (8.6% versus 4.3%).  Similarly, 
more than 69% of workers were expected to 
be promoted in for-profits, versus only 56% 
in nonprofits.  Both differences in means 
are statistically significantly different from 
zero, with t-statistics exceeding 3.5.  Table 
2 also reveals many other firm and worker 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics.
     Difference 
Variable Full Sample Nonprofits For-Profits (p-value)
Promotions 0.076 0.043 0.086 –0.043
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.000)
Expected Promotions 0.666 0.560 0.694 –0.134
  (0.013) (0.036) (0.013) (0.000)
Firm Characteristics
For-Profit Status 0.752   
  (0.015)   
Franchise 0.061 0.018 0.073 –0.055
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000)
Number of Sites 62.885 37.367 73.393 –36.026
  (7.979) (11.943) (10.635) (0.024)
Establishment Size 744.814 1243.028 631.593 611.435
  (225.476) (180.76) (315.958) (0.093)
Union 17.569 37.506 10.982 26.523
  (1.054) (3.141) (0.914) (0.000)
Fraction of High-Skill Employees 0.315 0.526 0.255 0.271
  (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.000)
Temporary Workers 0.356 0.481 0.330 0.151
  (0.014) (0.036) (0.016) (0.000)
Contract Workers 0.297 0.421 0.263 0.158
  (0.012) (0.035) (0.013) (0.000)
Hiring Rate 19.548 13.734 17.018 –3.284
  (1.619) (4.504) (1.607) (0.492)
Separation Rate 28.031 10.786 31.379 –20.593
  (7.424) (2.571) (9.733) (0.041)
Net Change in Employees 5.898 11.267 1.758 9.510
  (3.087) (7.527) (3.438) (0.251)
Industry
Construction and Mining 0.026 0.007 0.032 –0.025
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000)
Manufacturing 0.199 0.031 0.251 –0.220
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.000)
Transportation 0.056 0.030 0.064 –0.034
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.030)
Wholesale Trade 0.075 0.005 0.099 –0.095
  (0.010) (0.002) (0.014) (0.000)
Retail Trade 0.152 0.015 0.190 –0.175
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.000)
Finance 0.073 0.030 0.084 –0.055
  (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.000)
Services 0.401 0.829 0.275 0.554
  (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.000)
Public Administration 0.014 0.051 0.002 0.048
  (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000)
Continued
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characteristics that differ between the for-
profit and nonprofit subsamples.  Most of 
these differences in means are statistically 
significantly different from zero.
Promotions in Nonprofit  
and For-Profit Organizations
The results in Table 2 on differences 
Table 2.  Contin.
     Difference 
Variable Full Sample Nonprofits For-Profits (p-value)
Employee Characteristics
Performance 78.335 80.794 77.798 2.996
  (0.428) (1.259) (0.465) (0.026)
Typical Performance 76.146 79.055 75.501 3.554
  (0.389) (0.728) (0.479) (0.000)
High School Degree or More 0.256 0.212 0.268 –0.056
  (0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.036)
College Degree or More 0.348 0.556 0.303 0.254
  (0.017) (0.035) (0.020) (0.000)
Tenure 116.655 106.086 119.093 –13.007
  (4.877) (9.354) (6.057) (0.243)
Demographics
Age 30.606 33.067 30.200 2.867
  (0.249) (0.745) (0.246) (0.000)
Male 0.477 0.314 0.534 –0.220
  (0.014) (0.035) (0.016) (0.000)
White 0.604 0.602 0.598 0.004
  (0.014) (0.035) (0.016) (0.925)
Black 0.171 0.193 0.160 0.033
  (0.009) (0.024) (0.010) (0.196)
Hispanic 0.144 0.138 0.153 –0.015
  (0.010) (0.024) (0.011) (0.566)
Other Non-White 0.081 0.068 0.089 –0.021
  (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.327)
Job Characteristics
Talk 0.608 0.828 0.531 0.298
  (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) (0.000)
Phone 0.565 0.596 0.560 0.035
  (0.014) (0.035) (0.016) (0.361)
Math 0.679 0.623 0.699 –0.076
  (0.013) (0.034) (0.014) (0.037)
Compute 0.587 0.607 0.604 0.003
  (0.013) (0.035) (0.014) (0.939)
Read 0.606 0.731 0.578 0.153
  (0.013) (0.033) (0.015) (0.000)
Write 0.421 0.620 0.369 0.251
  (0.015) (0.031) (0.017) (0.000)
Position Requires College Degree 0.283 0.518 0.226 0.291
  (0.017) (0.035) (0.020) (0.000)
Number of Observations 3,201 695 2,506 n/a
Notes:  Cell entries are weighted means for the full, nonprofit, and for-profit samples.  Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors in the first three columns and p-values in the fourth column.  Many variables contain missing 
values, and statistics are computed using all available data for each variable. 
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between nonprofits and for-profits in the 
probabilities of promotion and expected 
promotion are unconditional.  Since other 
variables correlated with both nonprofit 
status and promotions might explain these 
results, we turn to multivariate analysis.  Two 
key control variables are worth mentioning. 
The first is tenure with the establishment, 
since a shorter average tenure in the non-
profit subsample (as revealed in Table 2) 
implies that nonprofit workers had been at 
risk for promotion for a shorter time than 
workers in the for-profit subsample.  The 
second is worker ability, since this is surely 
correlated with promotion prospects and 
potentially differed across the two sectors. 
Since ability is rarely measurable in data sets 
spanning multiple firms, the typical approach 
is to treat educational attainment as a proxy 
or to use individual fixed effects when panel 
data are available.  By itself, however, educa-
tional attainment is a crude proxy for worker 
ability, and a unique and attractive feature 
of the MCSUI data set is the presence of a 
job-specific performance rating for the most 
recently hired worker in the starting job.  It 
is performance in this job that is relevant 
for determining whether the worker will be 
promoted or not.  The survey also includes 
a measure of the performance of the “typical 
employee” in this same position.
Table 3 reports the results of probit mod-
els for the probabilities of promotion and 
expected promotion.  Even in the presence 
of controls for worker performance, educa-
tional attainment, tenure, firm characteris-
tics, and industry, the predicted probabilities 
associated with for-profit status are higher 
than those for nonprofit status, and the dif-
ference is statistically significantly different 
from zero.  For-profit status is associated with 
an increase in the probability of promotion 
of 4.2 percentage points and with an increase 
in the probability of expected promotion of 
12.5 percentage points, and in both cases the 
Z-statistics exceed 2.5.  These magnitudes 
closely mirror those of the unconditional 
results reported in the first two rows of Table 
2.  The result that promotions were less likely 
in nonprofits than in for-profits is new and is 
the main result of this study.  We also note that 
the signs of the effects of the performance 
Table 3.  Probabilities of  
Promotion and Expected Promotion.
   Expected 
Independent Variable Promotions Promotions
For-Profit Status 0.042** 0.125**
  (0.014) (0.049)
Employee Characteristics
 Performance 0.180** 0.407**
  (0.048) (0.094)
 Typical Performance –0.070 –0.324**
  (0.044) (0.116)
 High School Degree –0.001 0.001
 or More (0.013) (0.030)
 College Degree or More –0.052** 0.030
  (0.014) (0.040)
 Tenure 0.168** –0.439**
  (0.033) (0.091)
Firm Characteristics
 Franchise 0.002 –0.000
  (0.023) (0.062)
 Number of Sites 0.003 0.079
  (0.012) (0.049)
 Establishment Size –0.006 0.077**
  (0.006) (0.033)
 Union –0.043** –0.147**
  (0.020) (0.057)
 Fraction of High-Skill –0.008 0.119**
 Employees (0.025) (0.057)
 Temporary Workers –0.001 0.089**
  (0.013) (0.033)
 Contract Workers 0.005 –0.003
  (0.014) (0.033)
Industry Controls
 Construction and Mining 0.025 0.131**
  (0.036) (0.058)
 Manufacturing –0.023 0.073**
  (0.014) (0.036)
 Transportation –0.027 0.032
  (0.018) (0.061)
 Wholesale Trade 0.022 0.096*
  (0.030) (0.052)
 Retail Trade –0.023 0.055
  (0.014) (0.045)
 Finance –0.034** 0.113**
  (0.015) (0.044)
 Public Administration –0.025 0.150*
  (0.033) (0.078)
Number of Observations 1,894 1,772
Notes:  For continuous covariates, entries are probabil-
ity derivatives from probits, evaluated at the means of all 
variables.  For binary covariates, entries are the change 
in predicted probabilities when the covariate increases 
from 0 to 1.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the 
.05 level.
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ratings (positive for performance and nega-
tive for typical performance) are consistent 
with what we would expect if promotions 
are determined by relative performance as 
in internal promotion competitions.  This 
result was documented by DeVaro (2006) 
using the same data set.
To gauge the robustness of the results in 
Table 3, we estimate a variety of alternative 
specifications.  First, we include occupa-
tional controls for four broad occupational 
categories (professionals, sales workers, 
service workers, and laborers and operators). 
Second, we control for worker demographic 
characteristics (age, gender, race).  Third, 
we control for characteristics of the job, 
in particular indicators for the frequency 
with which various tasks were performed. 
Fourth, we include an indicator for whether 
the position required a college degree.
2
  We 
also estimate specifications that control for 
whether or not the establishment offered 
each of 17 fringe benefits in the job in ques-
tion.  The nonprofit and for-profit sectors 
differ somewhat in fringe benefit provision, 
and even though there are not strong reasons 
to expect fringe benefit provision to be an 
important determinant of promotion prob-
abilities, controlling for these differences 
seems a sensible precaution.  Across all alter-
native specifications, the differences between 
nonprofits and for-profits in the probabilities 
of received and expected promotions remain 
statistically significantly different from zero 
and of the same order of magnitude.
3
  We 
present some of these specifications in Table 
4, estimated on the subsample of observa-
tions in the service sector (results for the 
full sample are available upon request).  The 
service sector is the largest sector in our data 
set and one in which nonprofits were heavily 
represented.  This permits a within-industry 
analysis, which mitigates the concern that the 
concept of promotion might differ substan-
tially across establishments in the estimation 
sample.  Table 4 reveals that the main result 
that promotions were less likely in nonprofits 
is strong in the service sector.
Not all jobs offer opportunities for pro-
motion.  In particular, nonprofits are con-
centrated in labor-intensive services, and 
in 1990 accounted for “64% of all hospital 
care, 56% of day care for children, 48% of 
primary medical care provided by mainte-
nance organizations, 23% of nursing care, 
20% of college and university education, and 
10% of primary and secondary education” 
(Hansmann 1996:227)—sectors that are 
naturally flat in job hierarchy and, by defi-
nition, not conducive to job promotions.  If 
nonprofit organizations are inherently flatter 
than for-profits, promotions will be possible 
less often in nonprofit jobs, and this might 
explain our main empirical finding.  The 
MCSUI contains the following question:  “If 
promoted, what would this employee’s wage 
or salary be?”  One possible answer was “no 
promotion possible.”  Cross-tabulating this 
response with nonprofit status reveals that 
nonprofits were more likely than for-profits 
to report that no promotion was possible. 
Fifteen percent of all establishments, 14.5% of 
for-profits, and 20.7% of nonprofits reported 
that no promotion was possible.
Even after we control for firm character-
istics, industry, and occupation, nonprofits 
were more than 11 percentage points more 
likely than for-profits to report “no promotion 
possible,” and this difference is statistically 
significantly different from zero.  To deter-
mine whether our main result is sensitive to 
this difference, we estimate the probit mod-
els for promotion and expected promotion 
excluding from the sample those observa-
tions for which the respondent reported 
that no promotion was possible for the most 
recently hired worker.  The main empirical 
finding that promotion probabilities were 
lower in nonprofits remains robust even with 
the exclusion of these observations.  In the 
core specification, the for-profit effect in 
the promotion probit changes from 0.042 
to 0.046 as a result of this exclusion, and the 
for-profit effect in the expected promotion 
probit changes from 0.125 to 0.111.  Both 
2Our basic model already controls for whether the 
most recent worker actually had a college degree or 
better.  In the data, this usually but not always matches 
the employer’s response to whether the job in question 
required a college degree.
3Later in the section we report results from models 
within educational and occupational subgroups and 
also models that control for establishment-level turn-
over variables.
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Table 4.  Probits of the Probabilities of Promotion and Expected Promotion (Service Industry).
  Promotions Expected Promotions
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
For-Profit Status 0.083** 0.084** 0.073** 0.066** 0.180** 0.175** 0.132** 0.115*
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.063)
Employee Characteristics
 Performance 0.084 0.085 0.126 0.083 0.168 0.188 0.259 0.129
  (0.087) (0.086) (0.092) (0.087) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186) (0.183)
 Typical Performance 0.033 0.032 0.059 0.066 –0.417** –0.400** –0.268 –0.241
  (0.087) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.199) (0.197) (0.199) (0.187)
 High School Degree –0.003 –0.004 –0.002 –0.017 –0.069 –0.101* –0.114* –0.164**
 or More (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.056) (0.061) (0.064) (0.065)
 College Degree or –0.083** –0.082** –0.089** –0.099** 0.023 –0.016 –0.006 –0.096
 More (0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.069) (0.080) (0.083) (0.091)
 Tenure 0.111** 0.110** 0.094** 0.093** –0.595** –0.611** –0.632** –0.658**
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.044) (0.183) (0.179) (0.196) (0.174)
Firm Characteristics
 Franchise –0.002 –0.002 0.008 0.012 0.025 0.033 –0.014 –0.002
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.113) (0.112) (0.125) (0.123)
 Number of Sites 0.045** 0.045** 0.040** 0.032** 0.296 0.262 0.142 0.183
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.190) (0.190) (0.175) (0.184)
 Establishment Size –0.008 –0.008 –0.008 –0.006 0.041* 0.041* 0.024 0.036
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.024) (0.039) (0.041)
 Union 0.021  0.021 0.020 0.020 –0.145 –0.135 –0.144 –0.125
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.019) (0.033) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102) (0.101)
 Fraction of High-Skill 0.070 0.068 0.048 0.044 0.239** 0.233** 0.261** 0.174*
 Employees (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.035) (0.085) (0.085) (0.090) (0.093)
 Temporary Workers –0.014 –0.013 –0.014 –0.013 0.180** 0.182** 0.206** 0.202**
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
 Contract Workers 0.025 0.025 0.034 0.027 –0.001 0.010 0.000 –0.032
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Occupation Controls
 Sales  0.010 –0.010 –0.011  0.020 0.054 0.064
   (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.067) (0.069) (0.075)
 Services  –0.004 –0.046* –0.028  –0.125 –0.166 –0.105
   (0.051) (0.024) (0.028)  (0.102) (0.104) (0.100)
 Low-Skilled Laborers  0.002 –0.036 –0.021  –0.103 –0.163 –0.095
   (0.058) (0.038) (0.042)  (0.125) (0.132) (0.133)
Continued
effects remain statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  We conclude that, while it is 
true that nonprofits were more likely than 
for-profits to report that no promotion was 
possible, this fact is not driving our main 
empirical result.
4
One potentially important control vari-
able that is omitted from the models in 
4
A related possibility is that a particular type of 
nonprofit job could be driving our main result.  For 
example, consider nursing jobs in hospitals.  Because 
of the nature of these jobs (nurses cannot be promoted 
to doctors), it might be that observations from one 
occupation or a small number of detailed occupations 
are driving our result.  This seems unlikely, given the 
information in Table 1 showing that nonprofit jobs are 
spread across all 19 occupational categories rather than 
concentrated in only a few of them.  Nonetheless, as a 
robustness check, we re-estimated our main promotion 
probits on 19 subsamples, each of which excluded one of 
the 19 detailed occupational categories.  The for-profit 
effect changed very little across these specifications. 
These results are available upon request.
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Table 4.  Continued.
  Promotions Expected Promotions
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Demographics
 Age   –0.022 –0.019   –0.319 –0.280
    (0.115) (0.104)   (0.281) (0.268)
 Male   0.022 0.033   0.138** 0.153**
    (0.026) (0.026)   (0.056) (0.052)
 Black   0.057 0.044   0.161** 0.138**
    (0.052) (0.047)   (0.055) (0.054)
 Hispanic   0.036 0.031   0.097 0.085
    (0.039) (0.036)   (0.068) (0.066)
 Other Non-White   –0.037 –0.032   0.110 0.117
    (0.036) (0.036)   (0.118) (0.110)
Job Characteristics
 Talk    –0.005    –0.111**
     (0.028)    (0.056)
 Phone    0.042    0.107*
     (0.027)    (0.063)
 Math    0.003    –0.090*
     (0.022)    (0.051)
 Compute    0.010    0.085
     (0.023)    (0.063)
 Read    0.033    0.052
     (0.022)    (0.068)
 Write    0.036    0.119**
     (0.024)    (0.056)
 Position Requires College    –0.009    0.072
 Degree    (0.037)    (0.076)
Number of Observations 683 679 636 628 642 638 602 594
Notes:  For continuous covariates, entries are probability derivatives evaluated at the means of all covariates. 
For binary covariates, entries measure the change in predicted probabilities when the dummy covariate increases 
from 0 to 1.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level.
Tables 3 and 4 is the growth rate of the 
establishment.  If, for example, the for-
profit sector had a higher growth rate than 
the nonprofit sector during the analysis 
period, this could explain the difference 
in promotion rates between nonprofits 
and for-profits.  Unfortunately, the MCSUI 
data do not include usable information 
on, for example, the growth rate of sales 
or revenues.  However, we can control for 
establishment-wide employee growth, and 
this should be positively correlated with 
growth in sales.  We address this issue in 
the following subsection.
Do Rates of Turnover and  
Internal Hiring Differ Between  
For-Profits and Nonprofits?
If rates of turnover differ between for-
profits and nonprofits, this might explain 
the observed difference in promotion rates 
between the two sectors.  The predicted 
relationship between turnover and promo-
tion rates depends on a number of factors. 
Consider first a hierarchical organizational 
structure with fixed job slots.  That is, each 
level of the job hierarchy involves a distinct 
set of tasks, so that promotions assign workers 
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to different jobs with different sets of tasks. 
In such firms, in the absence of employment 
growth, both very low and very high rates of 
turnover are associated with low promotion 
probabilities.  With low turnover rates, promo-
tions are infrequent because opportunities 
for promotion only arise when vacancies are 
created by separations.  With high turnover 
rates, the most recently hired worker has 
likely not been with the establishment long 
enough to receive a promotion.  Further-
more, the worker is not expected to be with 
the establishment long enough to receive a 
promotion.
If job slots are flexible rather than fixed, 
then even with a hierarchical organizational 
structure, the relationship between turnover 
and promotion rates is somewhat different. 
Job slots are described as flexible when the 
production process does not necessitate hav-
ing specific numbers of workers at each job 
level (for example, one manager, five assistant 
managers, and fifty production workers). 
When job slots are flexible, promotions re-
flect mostly changes in job title without large 
changes in tasks performed.  Jobs in research 
are often described by flexible job slots.  In 
firms with a hierarchical structure and flex-
ible job slots, promotion rates can be high 
even when turnover is low, since promotion 
opportunities do not hinge on the creation 
of vacancies.  Finally, other things equal, 
promotion rates should be lower in establish-
ments with flatter organizational structures, 
regardless of turnover rates.
To summarize this discussion, the relation-
ship between promotion rates and turnover 
depends on a number of factors, the most 
obvious being the organizational structure. 
A further complication is that even among 
establishments with equal rates of turnover, 
the distribution of these turnover rates 
across levels of a job hierarchy could be 
quite different between establishments.  For 
example, one establishment might experi-
ence high turnover at the lowest rungs of 
the promotional job ladder and much lower 
rates of turnover higher up, whereas another 
establishment might experience roughly 
comparable turnover rates at all levels of the 
job hierarchy.
The MCSUI contains questions about 
the numbers of new hires, discharges, quits, 
layoffs, and recalls that occurred between 
the start of 1992 and the survey date.  We 
use this information to construct measures 
of monthly hiring rates, separation rates, 
and net change in the work force for each 
establishment.  As seen in Table 2, only the 
separation rate has a difference in means 
between nonprofits and for-profits that is 
statistically significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level.  For-profits had higher monthly 
rates of separation during the sample period 
than did nonprofits.  However, including the 
separation rate as a control in the promo-
tion probability models of Table 3 leaves the 
main result largely unchanged.  The effects 
of for-profit status on the probabilities of 
promotion and expected promotion from 
the first row of Table 3 change to 0.046 (Z = 
2.94) and 0.113 (Z = 2.16), respectively.  If 
hiring rate, separation rate, and net change 
are included simultaneously as controls, these 
effects change to 0.041 (Z = 2.30) and 0.090 
(Z = 1.58).  While the effect of for-profit 
status on expected promotions is no longer 
statistically significantly different from zero 
in the presence of these three controls, its 
magnitude diminishes only modestly relative 
to its magnitude in Table 3, and the Z-statistic 
still exceeds 1.5.
As an additional robustness check, given 
that some for-profits had very high separation 
rates, we estimate the models in Table 3 for 
the subsample of observations with separation 
rates less than 75.  That yields a sample size 
of 1,642 in the promotion model and 1,532 
in the expected promotion model.  The for-
profit result in the promotion model is 0.044 
(Z = 2.75), and the result in the expected 
promotion model is 0.113 (Z = 2.17).
The evidence suggests that, at least at 
the level of the entire establishment, differ-
ences in turnover between nonprofits and 
for-profits cannot explain our main result. 
However, we caution that since our focus is on 
the probabilities of promotion and expected 
promotion for the most recently hired worker, 
the more relevant measures of turnover would 
pertain only to workers of that skill type and 
to workers located at higher rungs of the 
promotional hierarchy.  Establishments with 
high overall turnover rates might still have 
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experienced low turnover for certain jobs, 
such as the one into which the most recent 
worker was hired.  Unfortunately, the data 
provide no information about turnover rates 
in each establishment by hierarchical level.
We now turn to the issue of internal hir-
ing, which relates closely to promotions. 
The MCSUI data lack a direct measure of 
internal hiring policies.  The only informa-
tion available is the employer’s answer to the 
question, “Do you have formal procedures for 
posting internal job openings and soliciting 
applications for filling them?”  As a proxy 
for internal hiring policies, this measure is 
subject to biases in both directions.  Some 
organizations may have engaged in significant 
internal hiring, even in the absence of formal 
procedures for posting internal job open-
ings.  Alternatively, some may have engaged 
in relatively little internal hiring, even with 
formal procedures in place.  Sixty percent 
of the respondents reported having formal 
procedures for internal hiring, though non-
profits were 37 percentage points more likely 
than for-profits to have these procedures. 
After controlling for firm characteristics and 
industry, this difference diminishes to 30% 
with a Z-statistic exceeding 7.
One interpretation of this result is that 
nonprofits were more likely than for-profits 
to have internal hiring policies characterized 
by high rates of internal promotion, though 
we caution that having formal procedures in 
place for internal hiring is not the same as 
using them.  It might appear that a higher 
rate of internal hiring in nonprofits is incon-
sistent with the lower rates of promotion we 
have documented in nonprofits, but that is 
not necessarily so.  Suppose that nonprofits 
rely on promotions mainly to achieve optimal 
job assignment (as opposed to incentives). 
Optimal job assignment might be achieved 
and maintained for a long time, with no need 
for job reassignments through further promo-
tions.  In this context, promotion rates would 
be low even if all hiring were done internally. 
Of course, promotions would create weak 
incentives in this context.  For promotions 
to create incentives, they need to occur with 
some frequency, so that workers believe there 
is reasonable chance of promotion within the 
foreseeable future.  The prospect of getting 
promoted to manager 25 years from now 
provides little motivation to work hard today, 
even if the firm engages almost exclusively 
in internal hiring.  In contrast, the role of 
promotions in achieving optimal job assign-
ment does not depend on how frequently 
they occur in an organization.
Do the Differences in Promotion Rates  
Between Nonprofits and For-Profits Exist 
for Both High- and Low-Skilled Workers?
We estimate the promotion probits from 
Table 3 on subsamples disaggregated by skill 
level, defining workers with a high school 
degree or less as low-skilled and all other 
workers as high-skilled.  As revealed in Table 
5, for high-skilled workers the probabilities 
of promotion and expected promotion were 
higher in for-profits than in nonprofits.  Spe-
cifically, for-profit status was associated with 
an increase of nearly 5 percentage points in 
the probability of promotion and an increase 
of nearly 14 percentage points in the prob-
ability of expected promotion.  For low-skilled 
workers, in contrast, there is no evidence 
of a positive relationship between for-profit 
status and promotions.  Furthermore, though 
for-profit status increased the probability 
of expected promotion by 10.5 percentage 
points, this is statistically significant only at 
the 10% level.
We also consider occupational groups of 
differing skill levels, defining four broad oc-
cupational groups based on a survey question 
that asked what job the most recently hired 
worker was hired to do.  Verbal descriptions 
were converted to 2-, 3-, and 4-digit codes 
according to the 1980 SOC for the final 
release of the MCSUI data.  Our four broad 
groups, in roughly descending order by skill 
level, are as follows:
Professionals:  Administrative, engineering, scien-
tific, teaching, and related occupations, including 
creative artists
Sales:  Technical, clerical, sales, and related occupa-
tions; precision production, craft and repair
Services:  Service occupations, including military 
occupations
Low-skilled:  Operators, fabricators, laborers; farm-
ing, forestry, fishing, and hunting occupations}
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As revealed in Table 6, the probabilities 
of promotion and expected promotion were 
higher in for-profits than in nonprofits for 
all but the least-skilled occupational group, 
though these differences are statistically 
significant only in the case of professional 
occupations (for promotions) and sales oc-
cupations (for expected promotions).
Summary
Our main empirical result that received 
and expected promotions were more likely 
in for-profits than in nonprofits is statisti-
cally significant in magnitude, precisely 
estimated, and robust with respect to the 
inclusion of other control variables that 
potentially explain received and expected 
promotions.  Excluding observations for 
which it was reported that “no promotion is 
possible” does not eliminate the result, nor 
does dropping individual occupations from 
the sample.  The result also holds strongly 
in a sample restricted to the service indus-
try.  The result is strongest for high-skilled 
jobs and is absent for the lowest-skilled 
occupations.  Controlling for measures 
of establishment-wide turnover does not 
change the result.  Finally, for-profits were 
less likely than nonprofits to have formal 
Table 5.  Probabilities of Promotion and Expected Promotion by Education Level.
  Promotions Expected Promotions
Independent Variable Skilled Low-Skilled Skilled Low-Skilled
For-Profit Status 0.048** 0.021 0.139** 0.105*
  (0.014) (0.029) (0.065) (0.064)
Employee Characteristics
 Employee Performance 0.105* 0.245** 0.503** 0.369**
  (0.057) (0.087) (0.145) (0.126)
 Typical Performance –0.048 –0.094 –0.391** –0.220
  (0.058) (0.071) (0.168) (0.152)
 Tenure 0.182** 0.134** –0.458** –0.433**
  (0.039) (0.051) (0.135) (0.112)
Firm Characteristics
 Franchise –0.028 0.058 –0.037 0.059
  (0.017) (0.055) (0.094) (0.059)
 Number of Sites 0.027** –0.271 0.094 0.066*
  (0.010) (0.183) (0.148) (0.036)
 Establishment Size –0.003 –0.017 0.075* 0.070
  (0.005) (0.020) (0.044) (0.050)
 Union –0.057* –0.033 –0.149* –0.136**
  (0.031) (0.028) (0.089) (0.061)
 Fraction of High-Skill Employees –0.046 0.032 0.177** 0.064
  (0.028) (0.048) (0.070) (0.081)
 Temporary Workers –0.021 0.017 0.169** –0.026
  (0.017) (0.022) (0.044) (0.044)
 Contract Workers 0.003 –0.0003 –0.002 0.0001
  (0.018) (0.022) (0.045) (0.043)
Number of Observations 942 952 888 884
Notes:  Results from probit models.  All models also include industry controls.  The “Skilled” sample consists of 
those most recent hires who have more than a high school degree.  The “Unskilled” sample consists of those most 
recent hires who have less than a high school degree.  For continuous covariates, cell entries are probability deriva-
tives evaluated at the means of all variables for continuous variables.  For binary covariates, cell entries measure the 
change in predicted probabilities when the covariate increases from 0 to 1.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level.
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procedures for internal hiring.  This might 
be interpreted as indirect evidence that 
for-profits did not have greater rates of 
internal hiring and promotion, though we 
caution that the measure of procedures is 
indirect and may not reflect actual hiring 
practices.
While we have controlled for a large num-
ber of factors, we cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that an omitted variable correlated with 
both promotion rates and for-profit status 
explains the empirical result.  The fact that 
many observable characteristics of workers 
and organizations differed by sector, as re-
vealed in Table 2, suggests that unobserv-
able characteristics may also have differed 
by sector in a way that influenced our result. 
For example, while our data are unusual 
in allowing us to control for performance 
in the pre-promotion job using subjective 
performance ratings, it is quite possible 
that these ratings do not fully reflect the 
qualities employers actually observed and 
used as a basis for promotion decisions (for 
Table 6.  Probabilities of Promotion and Expected Promotion by Occupation.
 Promotions Expected Promotions
Independent Variable A B C D A B C D
For-Profit Status 0.044** 0.034 0.051 –0.027 0.134 0.141** 0.079 –0.063
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.057) (0.102) (0.059) (0.123) (0.067)
Employee Characteristics
 Performance 0.429** 0.152** –0.108 0.178 0.468* 0.509** –0.420 0.057
  (0.154) (0.054) (0.105) (0.163) (0.273) (0.114) (0.318) (0.119)
 Relative Performance 0.075 –0.124** 0.068 –0.178 –0.758** –0.254** –0.067 0.018
  (0.076) (0.058) (0.089) (0.160) (0.301) (0.128) (0.372) (0.140)
 High School Degree –0.034 0.004 0.006 0.064 0.095 –0.019 –0.067 0.009
 or More (0.024) (0.017) (0.032) (0.058) (0.101) (0.034) (0.098) (0.040)
 College Degree or –0.051 –0.048** 0.007 0.052 0.141 –0.016 –0.111 –0.017
 More (0.032) (0.019) (0.047) (0.108) (0.104) (0.046) (0.204) (0.113)
 Tenure 0.148** 0.133** 0.227** 0.242 –0.738** –0.413** –0.695** –0.074
  (0.066) (0.040) (0.094) (0.237) (0.205) (0.095) (0.283) (0.134)
Firm Characteristics
 Franchise  0.030 –0.006 –0.021 –0.427** 0.085* 0.010 0.085
   (0.041) (0.032) (0.031) (0.173) (0.046) (0.119) (0.062)
 Number of Sites 0.007 –0.081** –0.342** –1.111* 0.215 0.102 0.075 1.973**
  (0.006) (0.038) (0.154) (0.629) (0.291) (0.071) (0.052) (0.906)
 Establishment Size –0.004 –0.002 0.007 –0.005 0.043* 0.116** 0.052 0.131*
  (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.019) (0.026) (0.043) (0.061) (0.070)
 Union 0.052 –0.051** –0.102** –0.038 –0.337** –0.140** 0.254* –0.077
  (0.037) (0.025) (0.051) (0.053) (0.130) (0.066) (0.139) (0.055)
 Fraction of High-Skill –0.068 –0.0002 0.043 0.051 0.243** 0.065 0.014 –0.036
 Employees (0.045) (0.035) (0.075) (0.069) (0.123) (0.059) (0.190) (0.101)
 Temporary Workers –0.002 0.009 –0.003 –0.001 0.213** 0.099** –0.174* 0.023
  (0.024) (0.018) (0.033) (0.019) (0.078) (0.036) (0.096) (0.042)
 Contract Workers –0.012 0.015 –0.008 –0.012 –0.120 0.027 0.029 0.006
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022) (0.094) (0.037) (0.090) (0.041)
Number of Observations 269 1,071 243 286 251 1,005 232 261
Notes:  A = Professionals, B = Sales, C = Services, and D = Low-skilled occupations as described in the text.  For 
continuous covariates, cell entries are probability derivatives evaluated at the means of all variables.  For binary 
covariates, cell entries measure the change in predicted probabilities when the binary covariate increases from 0 to 
1.  The Franchise variable is dropped in the first column due to collinearity.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level.
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example, motivation or tastes for particular 
types of work).
Similarly, unmeasured characteristics of 
employers that are correlated with both 
nonprofit status and promotion decisions 
may also influence our result.  Selection of 
workers into nonprofits is determined by 
the employer’s hiring behavior as well as 
by worker preferences.  Some recent em-
pirical evidence suggests that nonprofit and 
for-profit employers differ in their recruit-
ment of new hires.  DeVaro (2005) found 
that recruiting campaigns in the nonprofit 
sector are longer in duration and involve 
more recruiting methods than those in the 
for-profit sector.  One interpretation is that 
nonprofit employers seek to attract a par-
ticular type of worker who is sympathetic 
to and motivated by the organizational mis-
sion.  The need for a highly specific match 
would necessitate a more vigorous recruit-
ment campaign involving more methods 
and suggests that a longer search must be 
conducted, and more intensive screening 
methods applied, before finding the right 
person.
In addition to these issues of unobserved 
heterogeneity, another potential source of 
concern is that in our multivariate analyses 
the sample size is cut sharply due to miss-
ing values.  Mitigating this concern, in our 
view, is the fact that we find evidence of a 
statistically significant effect across virtually 
all specifications we estimate, regardless of 
the size of the subsample and the included 
control variables.  Furthermore, the magni-
tude of the for-profit effect varies relatively 
little across these specifications even when 
large numbers of observations disappear 
because of missing values.  This leads us to 
believe that the main cost of missing values 
in this context is reduced precision in our 
estimates.
Related Empirical  
Questions Concerning Incentives
We now investigate three empirical ques-
tions concerning incentives that complement 
the main empirical question of how promo-
tion rates differed between the nonprofit 
and for-profit sectors.
Are Promotions Equally Likely  
to Be Based on Merit and Job  
Performance in the Two Sectors?
Promotions create stronger incentives 
when they are closely tied to worker per-
formance.  The MCSUI includes questions 
about the extent to which promotions (out 
of the position held by the most recently 
hired worker) were based on “merit and 
job performance,” on “seniority,” and on 
“affirmative action.”  For all three questions, 
responses were coded as 1 = “not at all,” 2 
= “somewhat,” 3 = “mostly.”  We estimate 
ordered probits of these three dependent 
variables on the for-profit indicator.  The 
for-profit coefficients (with standard errors 
in parentheses) are 0.469 (0.120) for merit 
and job performance, –0.028 (0.086) for 
seniority, and –0.268 (0.088) for affirmative 
action.  If controls for firm characteristics 
and industry are included in the ordered 
probits, the results change to 0.359 (0.149) 
for merit and job performance, –0.041 
(0.130) for seniority, and –0.324 (0.123) for 
affirmative action.
These point estimates suggest that for-
profit status was associated with a higher 
probability that promotions were based on 
merit and lower probabilities that promo-
tions were based on seniority or affirmative 
action, though the seniority effect is not 
statistically significant.  For the two variables 
with statistically significant effects, the mag-
nitudes implied by the coefficients (in the 
specifications that include controls) are as 
follows.  For the degree to which promotions 
were based on merit and job performance, 
for-profit status is associated with a decrease 
of 2.3 percentage points in the probability 
of a response of “not at all,” a decrease of 
5.6 percentage points in the probability of 
a response of “somewhat,” and an increase 
of 7.9 percentage points in the probability 
of a response of “mostly.”  For the degree 
to which promotions were based on affir-
mative action, for-profit status is associated 
with an increase of 12.8 percentage points 
in the probability of “not at all,” a decrease 
of 8 percentage points in the probability of 
“somewhat,” and a decrease of 4.8 percent-
age points in the probability of “mostly.” 
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All covariates are evaluated at their means 
in these calculations.
We also estimate a probit model for re-
ceived promotions, using the performance 
levels of the most recently hired worker 
and of the typical worker in that same job 
(namely, the pre-promotion job) as inde-
pendent variables, along with controls for 
worker and firm characteristics and industry. 
We estimate this model on the for-profit and 
nonprofit subsamples separately.  In the 
for-profit subsample, a ten-point increase in 
worker performance on the 100-point scale is 
associated with an increase of 2.3 percentage 
points (Z = 3.75) in the probability of promo-
tion.  In contrast, in the nonprofit subsample 
a ten-point increase in performance is as-
sociated with only a 0.14 percentage-point 
increase in promotion probability, and this 
is not statistically significant (Z = 0.75).  In 
both subsamples, a ten-point increase in the 
performance of the typical employee has 
a statistically insignificant negative effect 
on promotion probability, though the ef-
fect is larger in magnitude in the for-profit 
subsample (–0.58 with Z = 1.19) than in the 
nonprofit subsample (–0.03 with Z = 0.13). 
When these results are combined with the re-
sults on the employers’ responses to questions 
about the extent to which promotions were 
based on merit and job performance, as op-
posed to seniority or affirmative action, what 
emerges is the clear implication that merit 
and job performance in the pre-promotion 
job were less often the basis for promotions 
in nonprofits than in for-profits.
Do Wage Levels and Growth Rates,  
within and between Hierarchical  
Levels, Differ between the Nonprofit  
and For-Profit Sectors?
The empirical literature on nonprofits has 
focused heavily on differences in compensa-
tion between the nonprofit and for-profit 
sectors.  The main aim of such research has 
been to test the proposition that workers 
who prefer employment that contributes to 
a positive social mission will accept lower 
wages to work in such jobs, other things 
equal.  That is, a compensating differential 
should emerge between nonprofits and for-
profits.  Evidence from a survey of student 
attitudes is consistent with this proposition. 
Rawls, Ullrich, and Nelson (1975) presented 
survey evidence on graduate students in busi-
ness at Vanderbilt University showing that 
students claiming to place less emphasis on 
economic wealth were more likely to end up 
in nonprofit jobs.
Studies of wage differentials between the 
two sectors have used a wide range of data 
sources, including samples of lawyers, execu-
tives, daycare providers, and recent Cornell 
University graduates, as well as broader 
samples from the Current Population Survey, 
the Survey of Job Characteristics, and the 
decennial Census.  Although the estimated 
wage differentials in this literature tend to 
favor for-profit workers, some studies have 
found either no differential or a differential 
favoring nonprofit workers.  For example, 
the recent study of child care workers by 
Mocan and Tekin (2003) found a substantial 
compensation premium in favor of nonprofit 
jobs.  Weisbrod (1983), who compared the 
wages of public-sector and private-sector 
lawyers, found higher wages for the latter, 
though Goddeeris (1988) used the same data 
and found no wage difference between the 
groups after accounting for self-selection.  In 
a study using over four million observations 
from the 1990 Census, the broadest sample 
to date in this literature, Leete (2001) found 
no evidence of an economy-wide nonprofit 
wage differential, though within particular 
industries she found wage differentials, some 
positive and some negative.  In summary, the 
empirical literature suggests that there is no 
for-profit/nonprofit wage differential at the 
economy-wide level, but that a differential 
does occur within some particular industries, 
with for-profits perhaps having the advantage 
more often than nonprofits.
In this subsection we analyze differences in 
wage levels between the two sectors and also 
differences in wage growth (both within-job 
and across hierarchical levels when a promo-
tion occurs).  We consider two dependent 
variables measuring wage levels:  the log of 
the most recently hired worker’s starting 
wage, and the log of this worker’s current 
wage at the time of the survey.  The reported 
time frame for all MCSUI wage questions is 
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either hourly, weekly, monthly, or annually, 
and we convert all responses to hourly wages 
measured in 1990 dollars, deflated using the 
CPI-UX.  Results are displayed in the first two 
columns of Table 7.  The coefficient on the 
for-profit indicator in both models reveals 
that in the presence of controls there are no 
statistically significant differences between 
nonprofit and for-profit workers, either in 
starting wages or in current wages.
For wage growth, we consider both intra-
level, or within-job, potential wage growth 
that is expected to occur in the absence 
of promotion and inter-level wage growth 
that occurs as a result of promotions.  Our 
measure of potential within-job wage growth 
relies on responses to the following MCSUI 
question:  “What is the highest wage or sal-
ary that any employee in this position could 
expect to be paid without promotion?”  The 
question refers to the position into which the 
most recently hired worker was hired.  We 
take the difference between the log of the 
highest wage obtainable in the position and 
the log of the starting wage as our measure 
of potential within-job wage growth.  The 
results, displayed in the third column of 
Table 7, indicate no statistically significant 
difference between the two sectors.5
Casual observation and previous empirical 
work (for example, Gerhart and Milkovich 
1989; Lazear 1992; McCue 1996) suggest that 
promotions are associated with large wage 
increases, but there is no prior empirical 
evidence on whether the magnitude of the 
increase differs systematically between the 
nonprofit and for-profit sectors.  To assess 
this, we construct a measure of the wage 
increase attached to promotion.  For work-
ers who had received a promotion by the 
survey date, we define this spread as the dif-
ference between the worker’s current wage 
and starting wage.  For workers who had 
not received a promotion, we subtract the 
worker’s current wage from the wage that the 
employer reported the worker was expected 
to receive if promoted.  Using this measure 
of the promotion wage spread, defined for 
both promoted and non-promoted workers, 
we find that the average increase in hourly 
wages from promotion was $3.25 in for-profits 
and $4.09 in nonprofits, with the difference 
of $0.83 not being statistically significant (p-
value = 0.378).  Thus, workers in for-profits 
and nonprofits received large wage increases 
of similar magnitude.
As an alternative way to assess inter-job 
wage growth that does not rely on a subjective 
measure of the wage a worker was expected 
to receive if promoted, we also estimate a 
regression in which the dependent vari-
able is the percentage wage change from 
the starting date to the survey date.  Inde-
pendent variables include worker and firm 
characteristics, an indicator for whether a 
promotion was received by the survey date, 
and the interaction of the promotion dummy 
and the for-profit status dummy.  Results are 
displayed in the fourth column of Table 7. 
The coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative, indicating that the average wage 
change accompanying promotions was lower 
in for-profits than in nonprofits, though this 
effect is not statistically significant at conven-
tional levels.  Controlling for the starting wage 
in this regression yields the same result.
To summarize, our results indicate no 
statistically significant differences between 
nonprofits and for-profits in wage growth, 
either within jobs or across levels of a promo-
tional hierarchy.  These results cast doubt on 
the hypothesis that in the nonprofit and for-
profit sectors promotions mean two different 
things.  One hypothesis is that job hierarchies 
are more finely sliced in the for-profit sector 
than in the nonprofit sector, so that a typical 
nonprofit organization may have a few big 
levels whereas a similar for-profit firm may 
have a larger number of smaller levels.  If 
true, this might provide an explanation for 
our main result that promotions were less 
5The average within-job wage difference (as opposed 
to the difference in logs) in nonprofits was $4.04 per 
hour, while in for-profits it was $3.33 per hour.  This 
difference of $0.72 per hour is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level, with a t-statistic of 
1.95.  However, controlling for only one other variable, 
establishment size, renders the difference in means no 
longer statistically significant even at the 10% level. 
Controlling for the full set of firm characteristics switches 
the sign of the difference in means and reduces the 
magnitude to $0.70 per hour, again not statistically 
significant.
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likely in nonprofits, since a worker could 
have reached the same level either from a 
single promotion in a nonprofit or from 
a number of smaller promotions in a for-
profit.  We would then expect promotions 
in nonprofits to have been characterized by 
larger wage increases than promotions in 
otherwise similar for-profits, and we would 
also expect higher within-job wage growth 
in the nonprofit sector.  Our results do not 
support this view.  Furthermore, the results 
suggest that nonprofits were not relying 
more than for-profits on within-job wage 
growth (as opposed to promotions) to cre-
ate incentives.  The results indicate that the 
two sectors were similar in the compensation 
associated with promotions (in both sectors, 
promotions involved large wage increases of 
comparable magnitudes), in within-job wage 
growth prospects, and in wage levels.
Do Nonprofits and For-Profits  
Differ in Their Use of Output- 
Contingent Incentive Contracts?
Output-based pay schemes could be based 
on output measured either at the level of 
individual workers (for example, piece-rate 
schemes or individual performance bonuses) 
or at broader levels such as the entire es-
tablishment or firm (for example, profit 
sharing and analogous schemes).  While 
profit-sharing plans, by definition, cannot 
be observed in nonprofits, actual measures 
of organizational performance in nonprofits 
are numerous.  Examples include the ratio 
of program service expense to total expense; 
income growth; changes in funding level; 
cost savings; changes in public awareness, 
quality of service, and fundraising volume; 
and customer satisfaction, or trustworthi-
ness (Hallock 2000).  Key to the attractive-
ness to employers of output-based schemes 
(whether based on output measures at the 
individual worker level or at the firm level) 
is the cost of measuring output.  Output is 
generally more difficult to measure at the 
organizational level in nonprofits than in 
for-profits, and the problems associated with 
such output-based pay using imperfect per-
formance measures have been clearly noted 
in the nonprofit literature (for example, 
Weisbrod 1988, 1989; Cleverley and Mullen 
1982; Oster 1996; Hallock 2000), as well as 
more generally in the agency literature (for 
example, Baker 1992).6
Recent evidence that the link between 
economic performance and pay for top 
managers is quite weak in nonprofit hospitals 
is found in Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould 
(2005), though the authors present evidence 
that this link strengthens with higher rates of 
HMO penetration.  Roomkin and Weisbrod 
(1999) found differences between nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals in the base pay/bonus 
composition of managerial compensation, 
with bonuses higher in absolute and relative 
terms in for-profit hospitals.  Further evidence 
that pay and performance are not as tightly 
linked in nonprofits as in for-profits was re-
ported by Werner and Gemeinhardt (1995). 
They studied a sample of 1,811 workers from 
69 nonprofits in the Houston metropolitan 
area.  The nonprofit jobs included those in 
employment and training, youth develop-
ment, mental health, social service, educa-
tion, arts and culture, and environmental 
organizations.  Werner and Gemeinhardt’s 
basic conclusion was that nonprofits did not 
tie compensation to organizational perfor-
mance, as measured by average annual budget 
growth and administrative efficiency.
The discussion thus far indicates that 
output-contingent contracts based on output 
measures at the organizational level are less 
prevalent in the nonprofit sector.
In the MCSUI, the respondent employer 
was asked if the most recently hired worker 
received “anything in addition to the wage or 
salary, such as tips, bonuses, or other supple-
ments.”  An affirmative response was given in 
66.8% of for-profits and 21.1% of nonprofits, 
and the difference in means is statistically 
significantly different from zero (t > 15). 
While this suggests that for-profits were more 
6
Easley and O’Hara (1983) took as given that orga-
nizational output is harder to measure in nonprofits 
than in for-profits and argued, based on reasoning 
from Hansmann (1980), that the co-existence of for-
profits and nonprofits can arise as a solution to an 
optimal contracting problem and that nonprofits may 
be superior to for-profits when organizational output 
is hard to measure.
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Table 7.  Differences in Wage Levels and Growth between the For-Profit and Nonprofit Sectors.
    Within-Job Inter-Job 
Independent Variable Starting Wage Current Wage Wage Growth Wage Growth
For-Profit Status 0.038 0.059 –0.002 0.003
  (0.065) (0.061) (0.030) (0.012)
Employee Characteristics
 Performance 0.280** 0.319** –0.179** 0.033
  (0.103) (0.097) (0.086) (0.026)
 Typical Performance –0.075 –0.010 –0.036 0.026
  (0.144) (0.139) (0.097) (0.040)
 High School Degree or More 0.119** 0.120** 0.016 0.010
  (0.032) (0.030) (0.020) (0.011)
 College Degree or More 0.194** 0.193** 0.042 0.006
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.029) (0.015)
 Tenure 0.304* 0.489** –0.042 0.107*
  (0.157) (0.161) (0.081) (0.058)
 Tenure Squared –0.093 –0.197* –0.022 –0.066
  (0.079) (0.115) (0.040) (0.055)
Demographics
 Age 6.093** 6.363** –0.467 0.601*
  (0.877) (0.940) (0.703) (0.327)
 Age Squared –7.550** –7.709** 0.673 –0.677
  (1.190) (1.319) (0.993) (0.453)
 Male 0.141** 0.138** 0.018 –0.001
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.009)
 White 0.133** 0.111** 0.012 –0.016*
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.009)
Firm Characteristics
 Establishment Size 0.027** 0.030** 0.009 0.005
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008)
 Franchise –0.053 –0.022 0.072** 0.035
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.036) (0.022)
 Number of Sites –0.064** –0.059** 0.042 0.009
  (0.019) (0.015) (0.031) (0.007)
 Union 0.137** 0.107** 0.003 –0.014
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.037) (0.010)
 Fraction of High-Skill Employees 0.298** 0.297** –0.114** –0.013
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.040) (0.018)
 Temporary Workers 0.039 0.024 –0.031 –0.007
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.022) (0.010)
 Contract Workers 0.046 0.052* 0.008 –0.004
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.009)
Continued
likely than nonprofits to have output-contin-
gent compensation contracts, we note that 
bonuses (and other supplements) are some-
times based on things other than individual 
output, such as aggregate firm profitability 
or the achievement of safety milestones. 
However, the MCSUI also contains a more 
detailed breakdown of a number of different 
modes of output-contingent compensation, 
and some of these (for example, commissions 
and piece rates) are clearly based on output 
at the level of the individual worker.
As seen in Table 8, nonprofits were more 
than 11 percentage points less likely than 
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Table 7.  Continued.
    Within-Job Inter-Job 
Independent Variable Starting Wage Current Wage Wage Growth Wage Growth
Industry Controls
 Construction and Mining 0.030 0.093** 0.003 0.052*
  (0.056) (0.047) (0.051) (0.031)
 Manufacturing 0.017 0.051 0.005 0.033**
  (0.039) (0.038) (0.029) (0.013)
 Transportation 0.038 0.025 0.024 0.002
  (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.018)
 Wholesale Trade –0.074 –0.078* –0.015 0.034
  (0.054) (0.046) (0.041) (0.026)
 Retail Trade –0.171** –0.153** –0.001 0.019
  (0.039) (0.043) (0.034) (0.020)
 Finance 0.029 0.067 0.024 0.042**
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.021)
 Public Administration 0.083 0.130 –0.014 0.045
  (0.083) (0.080) (0.056) (0.031)
Occupation Controls
 Professionals 0.309** 0.345** 0.058 0.017
  (0.060) (0.059) (0.035) (0.024)
 Sales 0.127** 0.137** 0.063** 0.011
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.012)
 Services –0.095** –0.084* 0.001 0.003
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.029) (0.015)
Additional Controls
 Promotion Occurred    0.101**
     (0.046)
 Interaction between Promotion    –0.027
 and For-Profit Status    (0.052)
 Constant 0.324* 0.181 0.499** –0.151**
  (0.177) (0.183) (0.127) (0.072)
Number of Observations 1,391 1,372 1,262 1,335
Notes:  Within-job wage growth is the difference between the highest attainable wage in the position and the 
starting wage.  Inter-job wage growth is the difference between the expected wage if promoted and the current 
wage.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level.
for-profits to pay commissions on sales, and 
more than 30 percentage points less likely to 
pay bonuses.  Furthermore, while only about 
4% of for-profits reported having piece-rate 
compensation, virtually no nonprofits used 
piece rates.  While about 30% of for-profits 
used profit sharing, only 1.3% of nonprofits 
reported doing so.7  The last row in the table 
reports conditional differences in means 
controlling for firm characteristics and indus-
try, estimated from probit equations.  These 
7While the definition of a nonprofit implies that this 
fraction should be zero, we suspect that affirmative re-
sponses to this question reflect different interpretations 
of “profit-sharing” on the part of nonprofit employers. 
For example, employers basing compensation on the 
ratio of program service expense to total expense might 
well have interpreted this as profit-sharing, since this was 
the only organizational-level output-based pay choice 
offered in the survey.
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cell entries are the change in the predicted 
probability of the dependent variable when 
for-profit status increases from zero to one, 
evaluating other covariates at their means. 
In summary, the empirical evidence here, in 
conjunction with the evidence from the pre-
vious literature, indicates that output-based 
compensation contracts (based either on 
organization-wide or individual-level output 
measures) were less prevalent in nonprofits 
than in for-profits.
Intrinsic Motivation and the  
Role of Promotions in Organizations
We now propose a theory that potentially 
explains the broad pattern of evidence we 
have documented in the previous two sec-
tions.  Our proposed theory brings together 
two ideas from distinct theoretical literatures. 
First is the idea that workers in nonprofits 
are intrinsically motivated by the organiza-
tional mission, so that incentives are created 
automatically when jobs reside in nonprofit 
organizations.  Second is the dual role of pro-
motions in firms, both in creating incentives 
and in assigning workers to jobs.  A difficult 
question posed in Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 
(1988) is why firms rely on promotions both 
to create incentives and to assign workers 
to jobs, given that the firm typically faces a 
tradeoff between these objectives, achieving 
neither perfectly.  It would seem to make 
more sense to use promotions for job assign-
ment, relying on some other vehicle (such as 
bonuses) to create incentives.  This has been 
dubbed the “Baker-Jensen-Murphy Puzzle” in 
Gibbons and Waldman (1999).  Our theory is 
that the prominence of intrinsic motivation 
in nonprofits enables nonprofit employers 
to de-emphasize the incentive function of 
promotions and concentrate more on using 
promotions to achieve optimal job assign-
ments.  In contrast, for-profit employers 
must rely heavily on promotions both for 
incentives and for job assignment, presum-
ably achieving neither goal perfectly.  That 
is, the tradeoff in the Baker-Jensen-Murphy 
Puzzle is confronted by for-profits to a greater 
extent than by nonprofits.
Intrinsically motivated effort is defined 
as effort a worker exerts in the absence of 
external rewards.  Theories of intrinsic moti-
vation have their roots in the organizational 
psychology and management literatures. 
The main source of intrinsic motivation is 
the design of jobs, meaning the particular 
characteristics or attributes of jobs.  Theories 
of motivational job design such as the Job 
Characteristics Model proposed by Hackman 
and Oldham (1980) focus on how certain job 
characteristics that are chosen by employers 
affect worker motivation.  One of the five core 
job characteristics in that model is “task sig-
nificance,” or the extent to which a job affects 
the lives of others.  Greater task significance 
increases the degree of experienced mean-
ingfulness of one’s work, which ultimately 
yields higher worker performance.
The mission of the organization can also 
serve as a source of intrinsic motivation, if 
it fits a worker’s value system (in which case 
we refer to it as a “positive social mission”). 
It is such mission-driven intrinsic motiva-
tion that is at the heart of our theory.  One 
interpretation is that intrinsic motivation 
deriving from the organizational mission is 
distinct from the intrinsic motivation deriv-
Table 8.  Differences in Output-Based Pay by For-Profit Status.
For-Profit Status Tips? Commission on Sales? Piece Rates? Bonuses? Profit Sharing?
For-Profits 0.058 0.125 0.038 0.486 0.297
Nonprofits 0.011 0.014 0.006 0.180 0.013
 Difference in Means (unconditional) 0.047** 0.112** 0.032** 0.307** 0.284**
 Difference in Means (conditional) 0.013** 0.036** 0.007 0.289** 0.280**
Notes:  The last row reports estimates from a probit equation controlling for firm characteristics and industry. 
These cell entries are the change in the predicted probability of the dependent variable when for-profit status 
increases from zero to one, evaluating other covariates at their means.
**Statistically significant at the .05 level.
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ing from job characteristics that we discussed 
in the previous paragraph.  An alternative 
interpretation, and the one we favor, is that 
a positive social mission itself shapes core job 
characteristics, so that the resulting intrinsic 
motivation may still be thought of as arising 
from job characteristics.  For example, in 
the Job Characteristics Model, a positive 
social mission would naturally increase the 
“task significance” of a job.  Thus, even when 
tasks are identical in a given job in two dif-
ferent organizations, if one organization has 
a positive social mission and the other does 
not, task significance (and thereby intrinsic 
motivation) should be higher in the organiza-
tion with the positive mission.  In this sense, 
intrinsic motivation driven by the mission 
and intrinsic motivation driven by job char-
acteristics are one and the same.
The key assumption of our theory is that 
a positive social mission (and thereby mis-
sion-driven intrinsic motivation) is higher, 
on average, in nonprofits than in for-profits. 
While a positive social mission is certainly 
possible in for-profits (for example, research 
scientists in drug companies might be passion-
ate about the perceived social contributions 
of their occupations and employers), it is 
assumed to be more likely in nonprofits.  We 
also acknowledge that the job characteristics 
associated with high intrinsic motivation are 
present in for-profit jobs as well as in nonprofit 
jobs.  Our theory does not require that for-
profit jobs be devoid of intrinsic motivation 
or that workers in for-profit jobs have no pas-
sion for the firm’s mission.  We only require 
that, on average, such intrinsic motivation is 
greater in nonprofit jobs than in for-profit 
jobs.  This assumption seems reasonable to 
us and consistent with the previous literature 
on nonprofits.
The idea is also in harmony with the theory 
of “labor donations” put forth in Preston 
(1989); with the empirical literature on wage 
differentials between the two sectors, which 
argues that nonprofit status represents a 
nonpecuniary job characteristic that some 
workers value positively; with survey evidence 
on worker attitudes (Rawls, Ullrich, and 
Nelson 1975); and with a recent theoretical 
literature in economics arguing that in the 
presence of intrinsic motivation, principals 
can economize on incentives (Besley and 
Ghatak 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2003; 
Francois 2000).  For example, Besley and 
Ghatak (2005) proposed a contract-theo-
retical approach to the provision of collec-
tive goods, drawing a distinction between 
“mission-oriented” nonprofit organizations 
and “profit-oriented” conventional firms. 
They argued that agents and principals in 
organizations that provide collective goods 
(hospitals, schools, and universities) care 
about nonmonetary aspects of their activities; 
such individuals are referred to as “motivated 
agents.”  The main insights to emerge from 
their analysis are that intrinsic motivation can 
substitute for explicit incentives in the orga-
nization, and that matching principals and 
agents on “mission-preferences” increases 
efficiency and makes high-powered incentives 
less necessary in such organizations.  Our 
incentive-based rationale for promotion dif-
ferences between the two sectors is consistent 
with these themes.
If our theory is correct, we would expect 
to find evidence consistent with promotions 
creating weaker incentives in nonprofits than 
in for-profits, since nonprofit employers rely 
on promotions relatively more for job assign-
ment than for incentives.  Three conditions 
must generally hold for promotions to create 
strong incentives:  promotions must be ac-
companied by wage increases, workers must 
believe a promotion is attainable within a rea-
sonable length of time, and promotions must 
be based on worker performance in the pre-
promotion job.8  We have seen that the first 
condition is satisfied in both the nonprofits 
and the for-profits we examined, since promo-
tions were accompanied by wage increases of 
comparable magnitudes in the two sectors. 
Regarding the second condition, we expect 
8A wage increase is actually not necessary for incen-
tives as long as there are other non-pecuniary benefits 
associated with promotion that the worker finds attrac-
tive (such as tenure in the case of a promotion from 
assistant to associate professor).  Nonetheless, in most 
contexts (in both for-profits and nonprofits) sizable 
wage increases typically accompany promotions, and it 
seems a safe assumption that these increases contribute 
significantly to the appeal of a promotion from the 
worker’s perspective.
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that workers’ beliefs about the likelihood of 
their being promoted within some given time 
frame will be shaped by the frequency with 
which promotions occur in their organiza-
tions.  If promotions are rare events, workers 
will believe that their promotion prospects 
in the foreseeable future are poor, and this 
will depress incentives.  In contrast, the job 
assignment function of promotions does not 
require that they occur frequently; one can 
imagine production settings in which opti-
mal job assignment is achieved and remains 
static for quite some time, with no need for 
any job reassignments through promotions. 
Our main empirical finding is that promo-
tions occurred less frequently on average 
in the nonprofit sector, suggesting that the 
second condition was not satisfied as strongly 
in the nonprofit sector as in the for-profit 
sector.  Our empirical evidence also indicates 
that the third condition was not satisfied as 
strongly in the nonprofit sector as in the for-
profit sector.  Thus, we interpret the results 
as consistent with the incentive function of 
promotions being weaker in nonprofits than 
in for-profits.
To further investigate the idea that non-
profits rely less on promotions to create incen-
tives than do for-profits, we use the structural 
model of promotion tournaments proposed 
in DeVaro (2006).  In a standard tournament 
model of the type first introduced by Lazear 
and Rosen (1981), promotions are used as a 
means for creating incentives.  Workers at a 
given level in an organization compete for 
promotion to a higher level, and the best 
performer wins the promotion (and the as-
sociated higher wage).  Thus, promotions are 
determined by relative performance rather 
than absolute performance.  Furthermore, 
the employer chooses the wage spread be-
tween the higher-level and lower-level jobs so 
as to elicit the optimal worker effort in the 
lower-level job.  DeVaro (2006), presenting a 
structural analysis to empirically test the pro-
motion tournament model using a subsample 
of 632 skilled workers from the MCSUI, 
showed that tournament theory yields predic-
tions on the signs of three key parameters.  In 
that analysis, all three estimated parameters 
had the predicted signs and were statistically 
significant.  If our incentives-based theory in 
the present analysis is correct, meaning that 
for-profits rely on promotion tournaments 
to create worker incentives more than do 
nonprofits, empirical support for the three 
predictions in DeVaro (2006) should be even 
stronger if we estimate the structural model 
on the subsample of 551 for-profits (out of 
the 632).  This is in fact the case.9
Furthermore, if our theory is correct, 
we would also expect nonprofits to rely less 
heavily than for-profits on output-based in-
centive contracts.  This is for the same reason 
we expect nonprofits to rely less heavily on 
promotion-based incentives, namely that the 
intrinsic motivation deriving from nonprofit 
jobs allows the employer to substitute intrinsic 
motivation for the explicit incentives created 
through output-based contracts.  Our empiri-
cal results reported in Table 8 are consistent 
with this prediction:  nonprofits clearly relied 
on output-based incentive contracts less than 
for-profits did.  In a related discussion, Frey 
(1997) noted that under certain conditions 
intrinsic motivation can be “crowded out” by 
external rewards like pay-for-performance, 
arguing that this could be the reason why 
managers of nonprofits receive a smaller 
share of their compensation in bonuses than 
do managers in for-profits.
Given that nonprofits appear to rely less 
on promotion-based incentives and on out-
put-based compensation than do for-profits, 
and given that prospects for within-job wage 
growth (and the wage increases attached 
to promotion) are no higher in nonprofits 
than in for-profits, it is natural to ask whether 
incentives suffer in nonprofits and whether 
workers ultimately have lower average per-
formance in nonprofits.  This appears not 
to have been the case in the establishments 
we studied, since the average worker perfor-
mance score in nonprofits was 80.7, versus 
9Using the notation from DeVaro (2006), the 
tournament promotion model predicts the following 
signs for the three key parameters:  a > 0, s12 < 0, and 
g3 > 0.  The estimates in DeVaro (2006) using all 632 
observations are as follows:  a = 0.591 (Z = 1.81), s12 
= –0.091 (Z = 1.72), g3 = 1.496 (Z = 2.89).  Dropping 
the 81 nonprofits from this sample and re-estimating 
the model yields a = 0.709 (Z = 1.98), s12 = –0.118 (Z 
= 1.75), g3 = 1.633 (Z = 2.85).
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77.8 in for-profits.10  This difference favoring 
nonprofit worker performance, though small 
in magnitude, attains statistical significance at 
the 5% level unless controls for worker and 
firm characteristics are included (in which 
case the statistical significance is lost).  If 
average performance levels are the same in 
for-profits and nonprofits, it would appear 
that nonprofits have some other means of 
creating worker incentives.  Our conjecture 
is that workers in nonprofits are intrinsically 
more motivated than for-profit workers, by 
virtue of their interest in the organizational 
mission of the nonprofit, so that effort is 
more costly to workers in for-profits than in 
nonprofits.
If our theory is correct, we would also 
expect the difference in intrinsic motivation 
(and thereby in promotion probabilities) be-
tween the two sectors to be most pronounced 
for high-skilled jobs.  In addition to our 
assumption that a positive social mission is 
more likely in nonprofits than for-profits, 
this prediction rests on two very plausible 
further assumptions.  First is the assumption 
that the work of high-skilled workers in the 
higher levels of organizations tends to be 
more tightly linked to the organizational 
mission (whether or not it is positive) than 
the work of low-skilled workers.  Second is the 
assumption that when the mission is positive, 
mission-driven intrinsic motivation increases 
as a worker’s tasks become more tightly linked 
to the organizational mission, whereas when 
the mission is not positive, no mission-based 
intrinsic motivation results regardless of how 
tightly the mission is linked to tasks.
The intuition is that the work in low-
skilled jobs, such as those of janitors, is so 
far removed from the organizational mission 
that a positive social mission will not create 
much mission-driven intrinsic motivation. 
Thus, if our theory is correct, there should 
not be much difference between nonprofits 
and for-profits in mission-driven intrinsic 
motivation (and thereby promotion rates) 
if we consider only very low-skilled jobs. 
In contrast, the high-skilled workers who 
tend to populate the higher levels of a job 
hierarchy will have tasks more closely tied to 
the organizational mission.  Thus, given our 
assumption that a positive social mission is 
more likely in nonprofits than in for-profits, 
for such workers we should see a large inter-
sectoral difference in mission-driven intrinsic 
motivation (and consequently promotion 
rates).  That is, promotions are less likely 
to be needed by the nonprofit employer 
as incentive-creation devices for an already 
intrinsically motivated staff of highly skilled 
professional workers.  Our empirical results 
are consistent with this prediction.
A similar argument was made by Preston 
(1989:443), who claimed that the further 
removed the worker is from the generation 
of social benefits, the less likely he will be 
to “donate” his labor at a reduced wage. 
Therefore, a negative nonprofit wage dif-
ferential is most likely to occur in manage-
rial and professional occupations.  Preston 
found some empirical evidence supporting 
this hypothesis.
As an overall comment on the compat-
ibility of our proposed theory with our em-
pirical findings, we are struck by how neatly 
the various empirical results fit together to 
compose a coherent picture.  In our view, a 
useful criterion for evaluating the relative 
merits of alternative possible explanations for 
these results is the extent to which each can 
explain broad patterns of related empirical 
evidence, as opposed to isolated single facts 
such as our main result that promotions were 
less likely in nonprofits.  While our incen-
tives-based explanation is only a conjecture, 
it is worth considering some of the broader 
implications suggested by it.  In particular, if 
our explanation is correct, then it should have 
implications for the choice of organizational 
structure in nonprofits versus for-profits.  In 
particular, the fact that nonprofits may be 
10Since incentives are not the only determinants of 
worker performance, a selection effect might be work-
ing in the opposite direction.  That is, it is possible that 
nonprofit employers draw from a higher-ability distribu-
tion of workers than do for-profit firms, so that even if 
nonprofits offer weaker incentives than do for-profits, 
this might not be detectable by simple comparisons of 
average performance.  A further reason for caution in 
interpreting this result is that performance expecta-
tions on the part of respondent managers might differ 
systematically between the nonprofit and for-profit 
sectors.  The performance measures are within-estab-
lishment scales.
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flatter organizations than for-profits may 
be understood within our framework.  The 
organizational benefits to be had from a 
flatter versus a more hierarchical organiza-
tional structure might be easier to realize 
in nonprofits, if promotions can be used 
mostly for optimal job assignment and are 
not as important for creating incentives. 
We emphasize, however, that while these 
considerations may play a role in deter-
mining the firm’s choice of organizational 
structure, the roles of environment and the 
production technology should be at least 
as important.
Conclusion
While previous literature has focused heav-
ily on differences in compensation between 
the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, we have 
focused on differences in the probability of 
promotion.  To summarize the results of our 
analysis of data from a 1992–95 survey of 
employers, (1) promotions were less likely 
in nonprofits than in for-profits, and this 
difference does not appear to have been due 
to differences in establishment-wide turn-
over rates between the two sectors, to other 
observed characteristics of workers or firms, 
to anomalous features of one of the occupa-
tions studied, or to the fact that nonprofits 
were more likely than for-profits to report 
that “no promotion [was] possible” out of 
a given job; (2) the observed difference in 
promotion rates between the nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors was more pronounced for 
high-skilled than for low-skilled workers; (3) 
nonprofits were more likely than for-profits 
to have formal procedures for internal hir-
ing; (4) starting wages, current wages, wage 
increases associated with promotion, and the 
potential for within-job wage growth were 
similar in the two sectors; (5) nonprofits ap-
pear to have been less likely than for-profits 
to use promotions as incentive mechanisms, 
as indicated by evidence that the relationship 
between performance and promotions was 
weaker in nonprofits; (6) nonprofits were 
less likely than for-profits to use output-con-
tingent incentive contracts; and (7) even 
though nonprofits used fewer direct incen-
tive mechanisms to motivate workers than 
for-profits did, average worker performance 
was similar in the two sectors.
We conclude with some comments about 
how this work could be extended with the 
development of new data sets.  As this is the 
first study to identify the intriguing result 
that promotions are less likely in nonprofit 
organizations, and since that result is based 
on only one data set, there is a clear need 
for future work that investigates the same 
research question using complementary in-
formation from other data sources.  Beyond 
testing the main result, there are a number 
of issues that might be fruitfully addressed 
with new data sets.
First, it would be interesting to conduct 
our analyses within particular narrowly 
defined industries in which nonprofits and 
for-profits operate side by side.  The MCSUI 
sample is not large enough to permit such 
analyses; the best we could do was to pres-
ent some analysis within the service sector. 
But a detailed comparison of promotions 
in for-profits and nonprofits that operate 
in the same setting (for example, hospitals) 
would be enlightening and would increase 
our confidence that a promotion in a non-
profit means the same thing as a promotion 
in a for-profit.
Second, it would be useful to compare 
rates of internal versus external hiring in 
the for-profit and nonprofit sectors, since 
questions about promotions are closely tied 
to questions about internal hiring rates.  The 
MCSUI only allowed us to make an indirect 
statement about this, namely that nonprofits 
were more likely than for-profits to have for-
mal procedures for hiring internally.
Third, a more complete analysis of poten-
tial differences in turnover rates between the 
two sectors would be desirable.  We found that 
our main result was unaffected by differences 
between the two sectors in establishment-wide 
turnover rates.  However, ideally we would 
want to compare turnover rates at different 
levels of the hierarchy rather than establish-
ment-wide, and while this was not possible 
with the MCSUI (since each establishment’s 
job hierarchy is not observed), it might be 
with future data.
Finally, longitudinal data that follow the 
same workers over a longer period of time 
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would provide a clearer picture of how the 
evolution of careers in organizations differs 
between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. 
While the retrospective information on pro-
motions contained in the MCSUI is useful, 
the sample construction based on the most 
recently hired worker is obviously limiting for 
analyses of promotions.  We observe at most 
one promotion event for each worker.  In the 
event that the most recently hired worker was 
promoted more than once since the starting 
date, this would not be detectable in the data 
(though such events should be rare).  More 
important, if a promotion is observed for a 
given worker we have no information on what 
happened subsequently.  This precludes the 
exploration of some interesting questions, 
such as whether promotion fast tracks exist 
and differ between the two sectors and how 
patterns of wage growth are affected by suc-
cessive promotions.  Data that track worker 
histories over longer time periods within the 
organization could shed light on these issues. 
The challenge is finding such data that span 







 Promotions = 1 if promotion has occurred by the survey date; 0 otherwise
 Expected Promotions = 1 if promotion is expected in the next 5 years; 0 otherwise
Internal Hiring Variable
 Formal Procedures for  =  1 if the establishment has formal procedures for posting internal job  
 Internal  openings and soliciting applications 
 Hiring for filling them; 0 otherwise
Variables Measuring the Basis of Promotion
 Merit or Job Performance =  3 if promotions are based “mostly” on merit; 2 if promotions are based  
   “somewhat” on merit; 1 if promotions are based “not at all” on merit
 Seniority =  3 if promotions are based “mostly” on seniority; 2 if promotions are based  
   “somewhat” on seniority; 1 if promotions are based “not at all” on seniority
 Affirmative Action =  3 if promotions are based “mostly” on affirmative action; 2 if promotions  
   are based “somewhat” on affirmative action; 1 if promotions are based “not 
   at all” on affirmative action
Wage Variables a
 Starting Wage =  the log of the most recently hired worker’s hourly starting wage at the time 
   of the survey
Current Wage =  the log of the most recently hired worker’s hourly current wage at the time 
   of the survey
Within Job Wage Growth =  the difference between the log of the highest wage or salary that any  
   employee in the position (into which the most recently hired worker was  
   hired) could expect to be paid without promotion and the log of the  
   starting wage
Inter-Job Wage Growth =  the percentage wage change from the starting date to the survey date
Output-Based Pay Variables
Tips =  1 if employees in the position of the most recently hired worker receive  
   tips, in addition to a wage or salary; 0 otherwise
Commission on Sales =  1 if employees in the position of the most recently hired worker receive a  
   commission on sales, in addition to a wage or salary; 0 otherwise
Continued





Piece Rates =  1 if there are piece rates for employees in the position of the most recently  
   hired worker, in addition to a wage or salary; 0 otherwise
Bonuses =  1 if there are bonuses for employees in the position of the most recently  
   hired worker, in addition to a wage or salary; 0 otherwise
Profit Sharing =  1 if there is profit sharing for employees in the position of the most  
   recently hired worker, in addition to a wage or salary; 0 otherwise
Independent Variables
Firm Characteristics
For-Profit Status =  1 if establishment is for-profit; 0 otherwise
Franchise =  1 if establishment is a franchise; 0 otherwise
Number of Sites =  number of sites at which the establishment operates
Establishment Size =  number of workers in establishment
Union =  percentage of non-professional and non-managerial employees who are  
   covered by a collective bargaining agreement
Fraction of High Skill Employees =  share of employees with a high school degree or more
Temporary Workers =  1 if establishment has temporary employees; 0 otherwise
Contract Workers =  1 if establishment has contract employees; 0 otherwise
 Hiring Rateb =  (number of new hires since start of 1992) / (establishment size × months)
 Separation Rate =  (discharges + quits + layoffs – recalls) / (establishment size × months)
 Net Change in Employees =  (net change since start of 1992) / (establishment size × months)
Industryc 
 Construction and Mining =  1 if establishment is in the construction or mining industries; 0 otherwise
 Manufacturing =  1 if establishment is in the manufacturing industry; 0 otherwise
 Transportation =  1 if establishment is in the transportation industry; 0 otherwise
 Wholesale Trade =  1 if establishment is in the wholesale trade industry; 0 otherwise
 Retail Trade =  1 if establishment is in the retail trade industry; 0 otherwise
 Finance =  1 if establishment is in the finance industry; 0 otherwise
 Services =  1 if establishment is in the services industry; 0 otherwise
 Public Administration =  1 if establishment is in the public administration industry; 0 otherwise
Employee Characteristics
 Performance =  most recently hired worker’s performance level on scale of 0 to 100 (where 
   100 is high and 50 is average)
 Typical Performance =  performance level of a “typical” worker in the position into which the most 
   recently hired worker was hired, on scale of 0 to 100 (where 100 is high  
   and 50 is average)
 High School Degree or More =  1 if the most recently hired worker has a high school degree; 0 otherwise
 College Degree or More =  1 if the most recently hired worker has a college degree or more;  
   0 otherwise
 Tenure =  number of months the most recently hired worker has been with the  
   establishment
Continued





 Age =  age of the most recently hired worker
 Male =  1 if the most recently hired worker is a male; 0 otherwise
 White =  1 if the most recently hired worker is white; 0 otherwise
 Black =  1 if the most recently hired worker is black; 0 otherwise
 Hispanic =  1 if the most recently hired worker is Hispanic; 0 otherwise
 Other Non-White =  1 if the most recently hired worker is another non-white race or ethnicity;  
   0 otherwise
Job Characteristics
 Talk =  1 if position requires talking face-to-face with customers or clients on a  
   daily basis; 0 otherwise
 Phone =  1 if position requires talking over the phone with customers or clients on a  
   daily basis; 0 otherwise
 Math =  1 if position requires doing arithmetic or other computations on a daily  
   basis; 0 otherwise
 Compute =  1 if position requires working with a computer on a daily basis; 0 otherwise
 Read =  1 if position requires reading instructions at least one paragraph long on a  
   daily basis; 0 otherwise
 Write =  1 if position requires writing paragraphs or memos on a daily basis;  
   0 otherwise
 Position Requires College  =  1 if position requires a college degree; 0 otherwise 
 Degree 
Occupation Controls c
 Professionals =  1 if the most recently hired worker’s occupation is an administrative,  
   engineering, scientific, teaching, and related occupation, including  
   creative art; 0 otherwise
 Sales =  1 if the most recently hired worker’s occupation is a technical, clerical,  
   sales, and related occupation, or  precision production, craft and repair;  
   0 otherwise
 Services =  1 if the most recently hired worker’s occupation is a service occupation,  
   including military occupations; 0 otherwise
 Low-Skilled Laborers =  1 if the most recently hired worker is an operator, fabricator, or laborer;  
   0 otherwise
aThe reported time frame for all MCSUI wage questions was either hourly, weekly, monthly, or annually, and we 
converted all responses to hourly wages measured in 1990 dollars, deflated using the CPI-UX.
bThe variable “months” is the number of months that elapsed between the start of 1992 and the survey date 
(which ranges from June 8, 1992, to March 15, 1995), using the day of the month to compute fractional months. 
For a small subset of observations collected by Kirschenman, Moss, and Tilly, the employer was asked about the 
number of new hires since the start of 1993 rather than 1992.  Since the actual interview dates were not recorded 
for these observations, we set these survey dates to March 15, 1995, the midpoint of the data collection period for 
these observations.
cBased on 1980 SOC codes.
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